When do governments concede to terrorists? by Lasiter, Nolan O.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2014-06
When do governments concede to terrorists?
Lasiter, Nolan O.














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 









Thesis Advisor:  Michael Freeman 
Second Reader: Robert Burks 
 
 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE
June 2014 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
WHEN DO GOVERNMENTS CONCEDE TO TERRORISTS? 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Nolan O. Lasiter
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER    
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  IRB protocol number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
This study addresses the question of whether violence leads to governments making concessions.  There were four 
hypotheses proposed that support the research on this question.  The first proposed that there was no correlation 
between levels of violence and concessions.  The second proposed that concessions increase as violence increases. 
The third proposed that concessions decrease as violence decreases. The final hypothesis proposed that there would 
be no concessions until a certain level of violence was reached, which was designated as a tipping point.   
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) served as the sample case study of this analysis.  The findings 
indicate that there is no statistically significant relationship between levels of violence and the Colombian government 
making concessions to the FARC.  Regardless of the amount of violence that the FARC perpetuates each year, the 
Colombian government does not make concessions.  Further analysis suggests that there may be a relationship 
between presidential parties, elections cycles, and governments making concessions.   
14. SUBJECT TERMS




















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
 i 
 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
WHEN DO GOVERNMENTS CONCEDE TO TERRORISTS? 
Nolan O. Lasiter 
Captain, United States Army 
M.A., University of Alaska Fairbanks, 2011 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
June 2014 
Author: Nolan O. Lasiter 
Approved by: Michael Freeman 
Thesis Advisor 
Robert Burks  
Second Reader 
John Arquilla 
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis 
 iii 




This study addresses the question of whether violence leads to governments making 
concessions.  There were four hypotheses proposed that support the research on this 
question.  The first proposed that there was no correlation between levels of violence and 
concessions.  The second proposed that concessions increase as violence increases.  The 
third proposed that concessions decrease as violence decreases. The final hypothesis 
proposed that there would be no concessions until a certain level of violence was reached, 
which was designated as a tipping point.   
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) served as the sample case 
study of this analysis.  The findings indicate that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between levels of violence and the Colombian government making 
concessions to the FARC.  Regardless of the amount of violence that the FARC 
perpetuates each year, the Colombian government does not make concessions.  Further 
analysis suggests that there may be a relationship between presidential parties, elections 
cycles, and governments making concessions.   
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 I. DO GOVERNMENTS CONCEDE? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When do governments concede to terrorism?  Very few studies address whether 
there is an empirical relationship between terrorist violence and governments making 
concessions.  Some studies propose that levels of terrorist violence increase following a 
government concession (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005).  There are also studies that propose 
that levels of violence have no effect on government concessions (Abrahms, 2012).  The 
premise behind this study is that terrorist violence coerces governments to make 
concessions, and furthermore that terrorist violence and government concessions are 
inter-related; that is, as violence increases, concessions also increase.  The argument here 
is that there is a relationship between these two factors.  What is problematic with many 
of the studies in the literature is that they do not test for this relationship (Abrahms, 2012; 
Tucker, 1998).  To fully understand the dynamic of when terrorist violence can coerce 
governments to concede, one must understand when governments do and do not make 
concessions to terrorists. 
B. WHEN GOVERNMENTS MAKE CONCESSIONS 
According to relevant literature within the field, governments do make 
concessions with terrorists.  Lichbach (2005) posits that when states are presented with 
the terrorist dilemma, they have two choices: 1) attack the terrorists and their supporters 
or 2) make concessions.  Some studies have argued that terrorism does work and does 
coerce a government to make concessions (Crenshaw, 1998; Pape, 2003; Pillar, 2001; 
Thomas, 2014).  In these cases, the use of terrorist violence increases the likelihood that 
governments will make concessions.  
Bombings and the threat of bombings are tactics used by terrorists to elicit 
concessions from the government.  An example is the 1983 Beirut bombings, where 
Hezbollah successfully bombed U.S. Marine Corps and French Paratroop barracks in an 
attempt to force U.S. and international forces out of Lebanon (Pillar, 2001).In another 
example, the attacks on 9/11 were an attempt by Al Qaeda to force the United States’ 
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 hand on the situation in Saudi Arabia.  Although the United States did not pull all troops 
out of Saudi Arabia, it did withdraw more than 90% of its troops, leaving only a small 
contingent to train Saudi forces (Pillar, p. 40).    In many ways, this was a concession by 
the United States that was in some fashion related to the bombings.  This suggests that 
there is a relationship between the terrorist violence as a result of bombings and the 
concessions that followed. 
Similarly, hostage-taking is known to force governments to make concessions to 
terrorists: it is a form of coercive bargaining in which the terrorist is trying to impose 
some cost on the government to meet terrorist demands (Crenshaw, 1998).  The act of 
taking hostages presents a dilemma for the government.  On the one hand, the 
government can ignore the terrorists by not bargaining and instead seek a military 
resolution to the crisis, but, according to Crenshaw (1998), this could pose serious 
challenges to the credibility of the government.  If the government chooses to pay a 
ransom for a hostage, it could lose credibility if the ransom payment becomes public.  
There are many examples of governments paying ransom for hostages.  France paid an 
estimated $3 million (U.S.) for the release of a French family being held by the Islamic 
terrorist group Boko Haram (BBC News, 2013).  Similarly, Germany paid an estimated 
$6.7 million (U.S.) to a terrorist group in Iraq for the release of Sussane Osthoff, a 
German archaeologist (Rosenthal, 2007).  The fact remains, however, that the use of 
hostage taking can be a successful use of terrorist violence to coerce the government into 
making concessions, such as paying ransoms. 
The use of suicide bombers is another tactic used by terrorists to coerce 
governments.  The logic, according to Pape (2003), is that suicide bombers have a strategic 
target in mind when planning suicide attacks and the attacks are meant as a means of 
coercing the government to make concessions.  The intent by the terrorist group is to inflict 
as much damage as possible, which raises the overall level of violence while 
simultaneously generating support for their cause.  Pape calls this destructive terrorism (p. 
345). In most cases, the terrorist is trying to raise the ante by increasing the violence within 
a particular territory so much that the government is compelled to make a concession by 
withdrawing its forces or face a revolt by the population within that territory (p. 346).   
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 Thomas (2014) also argues that using terrorism to extract concessions from the 
government can be effective.  The premise is that governments generally do not enter into 
negotiations with terrorist groups.  However, Thomas found that terrorists using their 
ability to cause violence and harm can in some cases force the government to the 
negotiating table (p. 3).  Through the use of violence, the terrorists erode the 
government’s credibility to protect the civilian population, which in turn can make some 
citizens support the terrorist cause (p. 4).  It is this loss in credibility and the increased 
use of terrorist violence to erode this credibility that forces governments to negotiate with 
terrorists.  This suggests that negotiations are a form of concessions by governments.  
Thomas’ findings indicated that when there were low to no successful terror attacks there 
was only a 20% chance that the government would negotiate with terrorists (p. 10).  
However, when terrorist attacks were high, the government was more than 88% likely to 
negotiate with terrorists (p. 10).  This suggests that as terrorists increased their violent 
means, there was a greater chance for negotiations by the government, thus indicating a 
concession to the terrorist groups.  Thomas’ case study involved terrorist groups in 
Africa. 
All of these studies present a situation in which terrorists used violence to achieve 
their goal of coercing the government into concessions.  The terrorists’ main goals of 
addressing grievances may not have been achieved, but the fact is governments do make 
concessions to terrorist violence.  These concessions can be in the form of ransoms, 
negotiations, or removal of troops from a contested region.  This suggests a relationship 
between terrorist violence and governments making concessions.   
C. WHEN GOVERNMENTS DO NOT MAKE CONCESSIONS 
Abrams (2012) found that governments sometimes do not make concessions in 
response to terrorism and that terrorism in many cases caused the state to “dig in their 
political heels” (p. 382).  In the 1996 Japanese embassy hostage crisis, 146 people were 
taken hostage by the terrorist group Tupac Amaru (MRTA) at the Japanese Embassy in 
Peru.  Six of those were American citizens who were freed early on.  It is speculated that 
MRTA recognized the U.S. stance on paying ransoms and released the American citizens 
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 first knowing that the United States did not make concessions to terrorists (Pillar, p. 40). 
The remaining hostages were later rescued by Peruvian military forces in a siege that saw 
only one hostage and two soldiers die.  This indicates that even when the number of 
captured or killed is high, the government will still not offer concessions.  
Many terrorist groups have discovered that targeting civilians in order to coerce 
governments into concessions is “unprofitable” because many states resisted this tactic 
when their citizens were the center of terrorist attacks (Abrahms, 2012, p. 367).  
Similarly, Tucker (1998) found that “conceding to terrorists” does not necessarily result 
in fewer terrorist attacks.  Both authors point out that conceding to terrorist demands do 
not necessarily decrease or increase terrorist attacks, but simply has no effect.  This 
suggests that there may not be a relationship between levels of violence and governments 
making concessions.    
D. TIPPING POINTS 
Gladwell (2000) posits that a tipping point is the point at which epidemics can 
continue to spread and increase until a certain point is reached and comes to a complete 
stop (p. 9).  Regardless of what the epidemic was doing before the tipping point or after, 
there is a point that all epidemics reach that tips it into a different stasis.  This study 
posits that tipping points are when levels of terrorist violence continue to increase day 
after day, month after month, year after year, and at some point a certain level of terrorist 
violence is reached that the government will make a concession.  This study seeks to 
address if there is a tipping point at which time governments will make concessions to 
terrorists. 
E. MEASURING LEVELS OF VIOLENCE 
The studies discussed so far have failed to address what the levels of violence are 
and how to measure them.  The relevant literature suggests that levels of terrorist 
violence are predicated on terrorist attacks.  Based on this assumption, this study defines 
levels of violence as the number of terrorist attacks.  The single criterion for terrorist 
attacks is adopted from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and is coded as total 
attacks (Tattacks) (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
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 Terrorism (START), 2013). Tattacks is the total number of terrorist attacks within a 
given time frame.  This study will not change these criteria, and they will remain the 
same throughout this study.   
This study will measure levels of violence by terrorist attacks over a given year.  
This is a superior measurement to the singular isolated terrorist incident or number of 
deaths resulting from a terrorist attack as a level of violence measurement within a given 
country.  For instance, on 9/11, more than 3,000 people were killed in a series of 
connected terrorist attacks, beginning with the World Trade Center’s bombings (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).  This is one isolated 
incident of terrorism within the United States for the year 2001 and only accounts for 
those 3,000 deaths.  Before this, the United States had a relatively low level of terrorist 
violence.  Contrast this with Colombia, which has been facing violence for almost 50 
years, fighting different terrorist groups and factions.  In 1997 alone, Colombia had more 
than 598 terrorist incidents with more than 1,230 people killed and 246 wounded.1  The 
central argument here is that levels of violence cannot be measured by one incident of 
violence or against the number of deaths alone but by multiple incidents within one-year 
spans.  The advantage of using this measure as a metric for levels of violence is that it 
accounts for all incidents within a given year and does not solely look at number of 
people killed resulting from one terrorist attack. 
Using this as a measurement, this study looks at Colombia and levels of violence 
spanning 50 years, beginning with inception of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) in 1964.  This study addresses whether there is a relationship between 
the levels of violence perpetuated by the FARC and the Colombian government making 
concessions.   
F. HYPOTHESES 
The cases studied so far have addressed when governments do and do not make 
concessions.  These studies do not discuss if there is a relationship between levels of 
violence and government concessions.  This study seeks to fill the gap by addressing if 
1 See Appendix A for more data on Colombia. 
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 there is an empirical relationship between levels of violence and government concessions.  
This study also seeks to understand if levels of violence will continue to increase to a 
certain point at which the government will stop the escalation and make a concession, 
suggesting the tipping point posited by Gladwell.  
This presents the central argument to this study.  There may be a relationship 
between levels of violence and governments making concessions.  The relationship may 
be linear and positively or negatively correlated.  There is also a tipping point at which 
violence exceeds a certain point, and the government makes concessions once violence 
reaches this point.  From these ideas, I present the following hypotheses: 
• Hypothesis 1:  There is no correlation between levels of violence and 
governments making concessions. 
• Hypothesis 2:  There is a positive linear correlation between levels of 
violence and government concessions.  Concessions increase as violence 
increases. 
• Hypothesis 3:  There is a negative linear correlation between levels of 
violence and government concessions.  Concessions decrease as violence 
increases. 
• Hypothesis 4:  There is a tipping point relationship where there are no 
concessions until a certain level of violence is reached. 
G. METHODOLOGY 
This is a focused single case study of the FARC in Colombia supported by data 
from the GTD.  The factors for this study are levels of violence, which is the independent 
variable, and government concessions, which is the dependent variable.  Determining 
levels of government concessions for each year was done by a strict coding scheme using 
specific criteria.2  Level of violence was determined by the criterion of total attacks 
(Tattacks) of the FARC terrorist group from the GTD.  The unit of analysis for this study 
was by year and the single terrorist group the FARC.   
This study uses regression analysis to test for a relationship between levels of 
violence and government concessions within Colombia.  Colombia was chosen as the 
2 See Table 1 for concessional coding scheme and Appendix A for the concessional coded table for 
Colombia. 
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 case study due to the duration of the conflict between government forces and the FARC 
as well as the availability of data on the FARC.  Findings from this study will determine 
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 II. OVERVIEW OF THE CASE: FARC IN COLOMBIA 
A. HISTORY 
Since 1964, Colombia has been in a state of constant conflict with terrorists, 
paramilitary commandos, and drug dealers, the most notable being the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (Central Intelligence Agency, 2014).  There are 
many factors that contributed to the conflict within Colombia, the primary one being 
social inequality between the locals and the government.  Another factor is the drug 
dealers’ desire to continue to profit from the coca farms within the country.  Adding to 
this chaos is the FARC’s efforts to overthrow the government through violent means for 
the past 50 years (BBC News, 2012).  All of these factors contribute to a certain level of 
violence in Colombia.  The government has two options at its disposal to tackle these 
tough issues: it can either attack the terrorists or it can seek peace through negotiations 
and concessions. 
Periods of violence in Colombia fall into two clearly definable periods:  1930–
1964 and 1964 to present (Dudley, 2004).  The 1930–1964 period is characterized by the 
civil war La Violencia between land owners backed by the government (conservatives) 
versus the peasants (communists) and guerillas (liberals).  This period set the stage for 
the following period, 1964 to present.  This period is characterized by the ongoing drug 
war between the FARC and the Colombian government.  However, just as there are 
periods 
of violence, there are also definable periods of concessions: 1982–1987, 1991–1992, 
1998–2002, and 2012–present.  These are the only four periods spanning the 50-year 
span of the Colombian conflict that the government has entered into negotiations with the 
FARC.  This thesis chapter will look at the periods of violence followed by the periods of 
concessions.   
B. THE FIRST PERIOD OF VIOLENCE: LA VIOLENCIA 
Through its long history, the Colombian government has faced one conflict or 
another—starting with La Violencia, which started out as a civil war and has continued 
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 until today’s conflict that involves terrorists, drug cartels, and self-defense groups.  What 
is interesting is that during each period, the government has used different strategies to 
address the violent struggles within Colombia.   
The conflict started in the 1930s between wealthy land owners and the local 
farmers.  The wealthy land owners wanted to subsidize the land in order to compete in 
the global coffee market, whereas the peasant farmers resisted this change and wanted 
their lands to remain unsubsidized (Dudley, 2004).  The government backed the land 
owners in their drive to subsidize the land for profit.  The local farmers sought help from 
the liberal party in Colombia to protect them from the wealthy land owners and the 
government that backed them.   
A very important figure emerged from this party by the name of Jorge Eliecer 
Gaitan (p. 5).  Gaitan was educated and came from the conservative party, so he was well 
aware of the land owner’s greed as well as their methods.  His rallying cry to the peasant 
farmers was simple: “Protect the weak from the strong (p. 5).”  This rallying cry set the 
theme for this period of violence. La Violencia is one of the most brutal periods (1930–
1964) in Colombian history, with more than 200,000 people dead as both sides jockeyed 
for position to win a conflict that turned from a land struggle to a party struggle between 
liberals, conservatives, and communists (p. 6).   
The land owners (conservatives) supported by the government attacked the 
peasants with such tenacity that many peasant villages were wiped out.  The peasant 
farmers, siding with the communist party, seeing their lands being ravaged, began to form 
their own self-defense groups in response to the violence.  The liberals began using 
guerillas as a counter to the government and the self-defense groups.  This period set the 
stage for today’s current struggle in Colombia, in which the government attacks the 
FARC and farmers using self-defense groups (e.g., Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia 
[AUC]) to protect their farms.   
C. THE SECOND PERIOD OF VIOLENCE: 1964–PRESENT 
The period of 1964 to the present has been an ongoing struggle for power between 
the government and terrorist groups (FARC), drug cartels, and paramilitary self-defense 
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 groups (AUC).  It is similar to La Violencia of the 1940s, but the government has taken a 
different approach over the past 50 years.  This includes negotiating with the resistance, 
making concessions, and in some periods attacking the threats posed to the government.  
For each year that the government has been in conflict with these threats, levels of 
violence have risen and fallen with subtle changes, but overall the violence has always 
been a constant. 
Of these groups, this study looks at two principal actors:  the FARC and the 
government forces.  The actors and their associated actions play a role in the level of 
violence and the government’s willingness to make concessions. 
D. THE BIRTH OF FARC  
FARC fighters originally started out as a small group fighting in La Violencia, the 
civil war between leftist guerrillas and the government (Johnson & Jonsson, 2013).  
Shortly after that war, the group reorganized under the name FARC in 1966.  In 1966, 
one of the FARC’s declared intentions was to overthrow the government (FARC-EP, 
2009).  The peasants, during the La Violencia period, felt that the government was not 
defending their agrarian rights.  Adding fuel to the fire was the government’s handling of 
the insurgency, which led to more atrocities against the local populace of Colombia, 
therefore increasing the FARC’s ranks and creating a picture of the FARC as “freedom 
fighters” fighting for the “rural poor” (p. 69). 
The birth of the FARC originated with its first leader, Pedro Marin, oftentimes 
called by his alias Tirofijo, which means “sureshot,” a name he earned for his shooting 
ability (p. 68).  His nom de guerre was Manuel Marulanda.  Marulanda earned his claim 
to fame, when, in 1964, Colombian troops tried to establish control of contested regions 
held by his forces (p. 69).  Marulanda and his small contingent of fighters were able to 
successfully repel the larger government forces and later reassemble in the mountains  
(p. 69).  His actions set the stage for the growth of the FARC as a small band of “freedom 
fighters” fighting the larger government forces.  These conditions set up a model in 
which the FARC would protect the rural farmers from the Colombian government’s push 
for land acquisition, which would then garner more support from the locals.  This then 
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 became a reinforcing model in how Colombia would push its military powers forward, 
which in turn the FARC would resist, causing more locals to support the cause. 
The fighting between the FARC and government forces has continued for years, 
and each step of the way the FARC’s recruitment numbers were reinforced by 
widespread support.  According to the CRS Reports for Congress Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (2004), the FARC had around 17,000 active members in 2004 (p. 2).  This 
number is probably half that number today, but that the FARC had grown to such a 
substantial number illustrates the influence and backing that it enjoyed in Colombia and 
to some degree still enjoys today.   
Although the FARC’s growth has declined substantially, it is not yet defeated.  
The FARC still possesses the ability to attack and cause substantial amounts of violence.  
In 2013, 19 Colombian soldiers were killed by FARC members in one incident (Reuters, 
2013).  This underscores the FARC’s ongoing ability to cause significant damage to 
government forces and keep levels of violence at a premium.  Accentuating the growth 
and the FARC’s ability to cause violence is the government’s ability to use tools to 
control it.  One of the tools the government uses is concessions. 
E. COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES: PERIODS OF CONCESSIONS 
La Violencia is not characterized by many concessions.  The government’s 
strategy was simple: overwhelm the opposition through violent means.  After this period, 
the government began to change its strategies.  This was not evident, however, until 
around the 1980s when we see the first major set of concessions and recognition by the 
government that terrorist groups were becoming a problem.  In order to address this 
problem, the government began making concessions.  To do this was to enter into 
negotiations with the terrorist groups.  For the purposes of this study, negotiations 
are considered as concessions by the government.  There are four distinct periods that 
the Colombian government entered into negotiations with the FARC: 1) 1982–1987, 
2) 1991–1992, c) 1998–2002, and 4) 2012–present.  Each of these distinct periods is 
marked by a different president using different strategies. 
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 1. 1982–1987 
Despite continued attrition of the FARC in the jungle, Colombian President 
Belisario Betancur feared that if something was not done, the guerillas would continue to 
grow exponentially (Dudley, 2004, p. 17). Under this presumption and despite protests 
from his military and contrary to military tactics advocated by the United States, 
Betancur sought to end the conflict through negotiated peaceful means.  One of his 
campaign promises was to create a “democratic opening” in seeking peace with the 
terrorist groups in Colombia (p. 17). The vehicle to begin the process was the opening of 
negotiations with the FARC.  This was the first attempt made by a Colombian president 
to negotiate with terrorists.  The previous administration under President Cesar Turbay 
had sought to crush the rebellion in the Colombian countryside through the use of 
military force (p. 32).  
Turbay’s policy had been simple: give the military a full range of power to deal 
with the threat.  The Colombian military was ruthless with this power: they killed, 
tortured, incarcerated, and otherwise eliminated suspected guerillas indiscriminately.  
This of course led to numerous human rights violations, that in the end, Betancur felt was 
strengthening terrorist backing and support (p. 32).  
Betancur’s policy was less aggressive than Turbay’s: seek peace through 
negotiations.  Betancur’s strategy during this period is marked by the Uribe Accords and 
the creation of the Union Patriotica (UP) (p. 20).  The Uribe Accords were a means to 
give the FARC a political party that would represent them and hopefully encourage them 
to lay down their arms in favor of a political approach to address their issues.   
Betancur made major concessions to the FARC during 1982–1987.  First, he 
granted amnesty to all guerrillas being held in Colombian prisons.  Second, he entered 
into secret negotiations with the FARC in the jungle in 1982, which led to an agreement 
with the FARC and creating the political party (UP) (p. 20).  Then, Betancur created a 
40-member peace committee to address all grievances cited by the FARC (Posso, 2004).  
Fourth, he created a demilitarized zone (DMZ) in the area of Uribe in which the FARC 
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 and the peace commission could meet.  Finally, he signed and put in effect the Uribe 
Accords, which were designed to address many of the FARC’s grievances.    
Betancur, in an effort to get the FARC to the peace table and as a show of good 
will, sent a peace delegation to the jungles to begin secret negotiations with FARC 
(Dudley, 2004, p. 20).   These initial negotiations were set up as a precursor for larger, 
more elaborate meetings between the FARC and the 40-member Colombian peace 
commission.  The negotiations discussed grievances such as agrarian reform, education, 
and housing.   
The second major concession was granting amnesty to all guerilla prisoners.  This 
created a problem for many in Betancur’s administration, such as General Fernando 
Landazabal.  He felt that the government was successfully crushing the rebellion, but 
releasing the prisoners was a travesty to the hard work of the Colombian military.  
Furthermore, Landazabal, much like his army, felt that this was a “betrayal” by their 
president (p. 33). 
The third major concession was authorization to create a political party to 
represent the FARC, the UP (Posso, 2004, p. 47).  As a product of the Communist party 
and FARC, UP’s goals were to create a voice within the Colombian government (Dudley, 
2004, p. 10).  This voice would represent the goals and agendas of FARC by serving as 
the political wing to the military wing in the jungles.  A large portion of the citizens did 
not favor the UP and the prevalence of self-defense groups saw the UP targeted through a 
systematic assassination of the party.  Within 10 years, the UP was all but killed off and 
did not have any party members left to represent them. 
The final major action by the Betancur administration was the creation of the 
Uribe Accords (Posso, 2004, p. 46).  These accords were set up to address the grievances 
of the FARC and other guerillas in the country.  Unfortunately, the accords fell on deaf 
ears as the congress and government officials only half-heartedly backed them, which in 
the end meant that the Accords were never fully realized. 
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 2. 1991–1992 
Colombian President Gaviria’s administration took an aggressive approach, but 
was still seeking to reach a negotiated settlement with the FARC.  The only concession 
made during this period was the government entering into negotiations with the FARC, 
the National Liberation Army, and The People’s Liberation Army (EPL).  This period is 
distinct in that there was a ceasefire in effect between the terrorist groups and the 
Colombian government.   
Gaviria sought to have the terrorists disarm and then give them a voice in the 
government with their own political party.  The National Liberation Army laid down its 
arms and joined the political process (Chalk & Rabasa, 2001).  The FARC and the 
National Liberation Army did not accept this offer, but formed the Simon Bolivar 
Guerilla Coordinating Body, which represented the interests of both guerrilla groups.  
The aims of the group were different because it was not considered a political party 
(p. 72).  The Simón Bolívar Guerilla Coordinating Body was created in large part as a 
way to reflect the group’s collective aims and goals to the Colombian government.   
The negotiations lasted less than two years and were punctuated by attacks from 
both sides.  The first round of talks in Caracas was called off when the FARC attacked 
one of the members of the Colombian congress.  The talks resumed in 1992, but again 
were interrupted and later called off completely when the FARC accused the government 
of detaining and killing one of its negotiating team, Daniel Garcia (Posso, 2004, p. 48).  
This led to a series of recriminations from both sides, which resulted in Gaviria’s 
administration declaring all-out war on the FARC and seeking a more aggressive strategy 
to eliminate it (p. 48). 
3. 1998–2002 
President Andres Pastrana’s administration took a dual approach by seeking to 
reach a negotiated end to the Colombian conflict with FARC, while simultaneously 
preparing his troops for further escalation of the conflict.  Negotiations during this period 
only served as a smokescreen for both sides, as each side pursued its own agendas in 
preparing to defeat the other side.  In this case, the FARC was recruiting, training, and 
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 refining its drug operations.  Meanwhile, the Colombian government was eliciting aid 
from the United States as it prepared for a more aggressive stance against the FARC.   
This period begins the classic cat-and-mouse strategy between both the FARC 
and the Colombian government.  The government would enter into negotiations under the 
guise of seeking peace, while simultaneously still preparing its military for action.  The 
FARC similarly would continue is efforts in preparing for conflict.  Neither side, one can 
argue, was really seeking peace, but only peaceful gains so long as it advanced its own 
agendas and allowed the opportunity to gain the advantage.  Each side was practicing 
“Colombian tradition,” preaching peace on the one hand and preparing for war on the 
other (Dudley, 2004, p. 56).  
Pastrana’s approach did include major concessions, however. His term is marked 
by the highest level of concessions for any period during this study.  Pastrana’s 
administration sought a dialogue with the FARC to end the conflict in Colombia.  He did 
this through a series of concessions: establishing a DMZ and removing all troops, 
entering into negotiations, and releasing of political prisoners.   
The first concession Pastrana’s government made was to enter into negotiations 
with the FARC.  A DMZ was set up in Caguan that covered five different municipalities 
(Chalk & Rabasa, 2001, p. 73).  The municipalities were established as a place for the 
FARC and the government to meet and negotiate conditions for a peaceful resolution.  
The real problem with this arrangement was that neither side was seeking peace, but 
rather it was a pause so that both sides could regroup to gain an advantage over the other.  
The FARC used this time to recruit, train, and cultivate their drug trade (Johnson & 
Jonsson, 2013, p. 71).  The FARC and the government also agreed on making the 
“negotiations” public and invited more than 25,000 delegates from different sectors of 
Colombia to participate (Posso, 2004, p. 49).  The negotiations were viewed on national 
television, so everyone could see what was really happening and have a vote on the 
discussions.  In the end though, this just became a distraction to what both sides were 
really doing: preparing for further intense conflict.   
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 The second concession was the removal of troops from the DMZ.  In 1998, 
Pastrana authorized the creation of the DMZ called “zona de despeje” which consisted of 
five different regions in Southern Colombia (Chalk & Rabasa, 2001, p. 73).  Pastrana had 
done this largely as a concession to get the FARC to the negotiating table.  To prove his 
seriousness about negotiations with the FARC, Pastrana himself even traveled to the 
DMZ to start the negotiations in 1999 (Posso, 2004, p. 49). 
Another major concession that Pastrana’s administration authorized was the 
release of FARC prisoners in exchange for government troops (“The Sentinel Project for 
Genocide Prevention”, 2013.  In June 2001, the government released 14 FARC rebels in 
exchange for 359 government police and troops (“The Sentinel Project for Genocide 
Prevention”, 2013).  This concession was made by the government following up on an 
agreement made between the FARC and the government signed in June (Posso, 2004, p. 
49). 
4. 2012–Present 
This period is marked by again an approach more restrained than that of 
Pastrana’s, with a slightly more aggressive approach to the FARC.  President Manuel 
Santos’s administration has taken a more serious tone with the FARC, feeling that it was 
close to defeating the FARC.  The FARC, on the other hand, felt the conflict had reached 
a stalemate.  This is the fourth and final period during which major concessions were 
made by the Colombian government.  This period is marked by three major concessions: 
1) entering into negotiations, 2) agreement to land reforms, and 3) agreeing to allow the 
FARC to integrate into the political process.   
The first major concession was the Colombian government agreeing to enter into 
negotiations with the FARC.  Many would argue that there was no need for the 
government to make the first concession, seeing as how the FARC has been militarily 
defeated to a point that it could not possibly overthrow the government (Melo, 2013).  
Additionally, the FARC has lost a considerable amount of its base support from the 
peasants, which greatly affected its ability to grow into a force capable of challenging the 
government.   
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 The second major concession was the agreement by the Santos administration on 
policies of land reform (p. 2).  The FARC started out as a resistance force opposing the 
land reform principles that Colombia had enforced in the 1960s.  This inequality of land 
distribution is what led to the FARC being created to fight the government in the first 
place.  There were two major actions being taken by the government within this 
concession.  The government has agreed to allow non–land-owning peasants access to 
land.  The second concession was to create a fund to ensure the equitable distribution of 
free land to peasants across Colombia (p. 2).  There is still some consternation and 
disagreement about this for fear that the lands will be used to cultivate coca for the illegal 
drug trade. 
The third concession is the agreement on political processes.  Santos’s 
administration has agreed to allow the FARC to integrate into the political process within 
the Colombian government (BBC News, 2004).  This includes creating political parties to 
run for office.  This is a major concession in that FARC members will now be able to 
affect Colombian laws and citizens’ way of life. One source of tension is the issue of 
FARC members running for office that have documented cases of human rights 
violations (BBC News, 2004).   
Colombia has had many violent periods of unrest during the past 50 years.  The 
next section will discuss how to code concessions made by the government to the FARC 
during these violent periods. 
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 III. CODING OF VARIABLES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The first step to determining whether there is a relationship between levels of 
violence and concessions is to establish a coding scheme for coding concessions by year.  
This chapter discusses how this coding scheme is created and the factors that determine if 
a given year has concessions and what level of concessions they are.  This scheme can 
then be used to code each year of the Colombian conflict from 1964 (Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia [FARC]’s inception) to 2012.  Levels of violence in 
Colombia can then be measured against the levels of concessions using this coding 
scheme. 
B. CONCESSIONAL CODING 
Government concessions are rated on a scale from 0 to 10, with 10 representing 
complete concession and 0 representing no concessions.  Government concessions are 
characterized by six criteria: 1) removing troops from contested land, 2) releasing 
political prisoners, 3) paying ransom, 4) granting reforms (land, social, political), 5) 
agreeing to open negotiations, and 6) granting political autonomy.  These concessions are 
qualitative and this chapter establishes are concessions are coded for this study.   
Government concessions can either be strategic or nonstrategic concessions.  Strategic 
concessions for the purposes of this study are those that result in changing the political 
climate of the state affected by terrorism.  A strategic concession generally results in the 
terrorists gaining something that matches up with their demands.  A hypothetical example 
of this would be the withdrawal of all British troops from Northern Ireland in order to 
appease the Irish Republican Army (IRA) at the outset of the Northern Ireland conflict.  




Table 1.   Concessional Criteria 
The following paragraphs describe how each criterion is scored relative to the 
overall level of concessions. 
1. Removing Troops from Contested Land: 0-2 
In many cases, terrorists use violence as a means to coerce the government to 
withdraw troops from contested lands.  This criterion establishes how concessions are 
scored when they remove troops from these contested lands. 
• 0- Zero to one-third of all troops are removed from the contested area or 
region.  For example, in the case of the IRA and Britain, British troops 
rotated into and out of Northern Ireland on a regular basis (Richardson, 
2007). 
• 1- Some troops are removed from the contested area or region.  “Some 
troops” is defined as one-third to three-quarters of all troops within a 
region.  For example, Al Qaeda wanted the United States to withdraw all 
troops from Saudi Arabia.  The United States withdrew all forces except a 
small contingent of troops (about one-third of what was there) as part of a 
training mission to advise and assist Saudi military forces (Time, 2003).  
• 2- Three-quarters to 100% of all troops removed from the region.  The 
withdrawal of all Colombian troops within five different municipalities in 
Colombia is an example of a concession to the FARC (Chalk & Rabasa, 
2001). 
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 2. Releasing Political Prisoners:  0-1 
Most governments do not make concessions to terrorists, much less release 
prisoners of political value or no political value.  This criterion establishes how 
concessions are scored when the government releases prisoners of both political value 
and no political value. 
• 0- Zero to one-third of prisoners the terrorists are demanding are released.  
As an example, if terrorists demand 30 prisoners to be released and the 
government releases 10, then the concession are coded a 0.   
• 1- One-third to 100% of all prisoners that the terrorists are demanding is 
released.  The prisoners are released as a strategic concession to terrorism.  
An example of this is the case involving U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, 
Charles Elbrick (U.S. Department of State, 2009).  Elbrick was held by the 
terrorist group MR8 and was subsequently released following the release 
of fifteen political prisoners being detained by Brazil.  The Brazilian 
government recognized the strategic impact that a U.S. Ambassador had 
within its country and quickly sought a way to defuse the situation by 
releasing the political prisoners.  If the government releases terrorists that 
have some strategic value, such as Osama Bin Laden or Raul Reyes, a 
major FARC leader, then it is coded as a 1.   
3. Paying Ransom:  0-1 
Concessions in this criterion are scored from 0 to 1.  Most governments will not 
release information on ransom payments made to terrorists because it can damage their 
credibility.  When governments do pay ransom for hostages, this criterion establishes 
how this concession is scored. 
• 0- Zero ransom is paid for the release of kidnapped hostages.  If ransom is 
paid, it is not paid by the government, but by private parties (civilians); 
thus, it does not count as a concession. 
• 1- Regardless of the amount, the government makes a concession and pays 
ransom for the release a hostage.  For this study, any ransom paid is coded 
as a concession.  Granted, most governments have strong resistance to 
paying ransoms, and this fact gives credence that if the government does 
pay ransom, it is a concession.  As an example, France paid 3 million USD 
for the release of a French family being held by Boko Haram, an Islamic 
militant group in Africa (BBC News, 2013). 
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 4. Granting Reforms (Land, Social, Political):  0-2 
This criterion discusses how concessions are scored when governments make 
concessions by granting reforms of land, social and political.  Land reforms are defined 
as giving terrorists safe havens from which to operate.  Social reforms are defined as 
giving terrorists the right to create their own laws or policies within a region.  Political 
reforms are similar to social reforms, but focus more on allowing the terrorists to 
participate in the political process of creating laws. 
• 0- Zero reforms are granted by the government as concession to the 
terrorists. 
• 1- Reforms given are greater than 0 but less than full reforms and do not 
significantly impact the government operating in the country.  Allowing 
the terrorists to participate in local elections would be an example of 
political reform.  Allowing terrorists to practice sharia law would be an 
example of social reform.  The Colombian government providing 
alternative funds for the agricultural cultivation of land for the FARC to 
deter drug trade in Colombia is an example of land reform.   
• 2- Full reforms are given to the country as a whole.  This amounts to the 
government complying with all of the terrorists demands of reforms (land, 
social, political).  If the government complied with all demands 
established in category two, this would equate to full reform. 
5. Agreeing to Open Negotiations:  0-1   
The opening of negotiations does not always result in a preferred outcome for 
either the terrorist or government, but that the government is willing to enter into 
negotiations can be seen as a concession.  Although entering into negotiations is a 
concession, it is not a strategic concession; therefore, it does not score the same as 
removing troops from contested land or granting political autonomy. 
• 0- No negotiations have started or been entered into.   
• 1- The government enters into or attempts to enter into negotiations in 
response to the terrorist activities.  An example of this is the IRA hunger 
strikes of 1981 in which 10 hunger strikers died, most notably Bobby 
Sands who was elected to parliament while in prison.  British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher refused to grant political prisoner status to the 
prisoners, which resulted in 10 of the prisoners dying.  In recently released 
papers, however, Thatcher had indeed sent secret messages to the IRA 
discussing opening negotiations.  The negotiations never occurred; 
 22 
 however, that Britain was seeking a resolution to the crisis through 
negotiations could be seen as a concession (BBC News, 2011). 
6. Granting Political Autonomy:  0-3 
Political autonomy is a concession in which the government grants a terrorist 
group some control over their political space; this includes creating political parties to 
represent them, such as the Union Patriotica and its representation of the FARC (Posso, 
2004).   
• 0- The government does not grant any political autonomy to the terrorists. 
• 1- The government grants a level of political autonomy to the terrorist 
group that allows them to create a political party and represent them 
within their own political space.  The creation of the Union Patriotica is an 
example of this.    
• 2- The government grants a level of political autonomy that interferes with 
government policies, and is a strategic concession for the terrorists.  In 
most cases, this will impact but not change the political climate of the 
country.  An example of this is Spain granting political autonomy to the 
Basque Separatist movement in 1978 (Goodman, 2002).  The Basque 
country was granted some limited rights such as right to control education 
and some low-level governmental policies within Spain such as security.  
However, the area still fell under Spanish rule, so did not have complete 
autonomy. 
• 3- The government grants full autonomy to the terrorists within a region or 
country.  In this case, the recognition of political autonomy of the terrorist 
group is so great that it changes the political climate of the government.  
An example of this is the election of Antonio Navarro Wolff, a former MI-
19 terrorist leader that was elected to President Cesar Gavira’s cabinet 
(Chalk & Rabasa, 2001).  Not only was MI-19 incorporated into the 
political process, but it was allowed to create a political party and have 
one of its leaders elected to the Colombian government. 
• The next section will discuss how this coding scheme is used to code data 




 IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. METHODS 
This was a two-phase focused case study analysis of the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia.  The first phase consisted of gathering data on Colombia specific to 
the FARC.  The data were then coded using the coding scheme created in Chapter 3 of 
this study.  Once the coding was complete, the data were then ready for statistical 
analysis.  The second phase of this study involved using regression analysis to determine 
if there was a relationship between levels of violence and government concessions in 
Colombia.  The data were further scanned for emergent themes that might explain why 
the Colombian government made concessions to the FARC.  The results will be discussed 
in the subsequent chapter. 
B. DATA SET 
Data are derived from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).  There are two 
variables in this study: the independent variable is levels of violence and the dependent 
variable is government concessions.  The unit of analysis was years, with 37 total years 
being analyzed (There was a 50 year span of data drawn from GTD, only 37 of the years 
had complete data, please see footnote).3  Of those years, 17 (45%) were coded with a 
level of concession between 1 and 5.  The remaining years reflect a period of no 
concessions regardless of the levels of violence. 
1. Levels of Violence 
The independent variable level of violence is based on total attacks (Tattacks) per 
year within the country of Colombia.  The total attacks for this study account for only 
those attacks by the FARC.  Other terrorist groups’ incidents and attacks are not factored 
into this study.   
3 There was a 50-year (1964–2014) period of data drawn from the GTD, only 37 years (1975-2012) had 
valid and complete data.  The other 13 years of data were not used as it was incomplete. 
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 Figure 1 reflects levels of violence within Colombia perpetuated by the FARC.  
Attacks by other terrorist groups in Colombia are not included in this study.   
 
Figure 1.  Levels of Violence 1975–2012 (after START, 2014) 
Analyzing the graph, there appears to be a cyclical pattern of violence.  In 1983, 
the FARC peaked at a total of 89 attacks and then began to steadily decline until 1986, 
where they began to increase again.  This was five years after entering into negotiations 
with the Colombian government for the first time in Colombian history.  Each year after 
that, attacks decreased as reflected in the figure.  Toward the end of negotiations in 1987, 
attacks began to steadily increase to 64 attacks and then began the cyclic decrease in 
attacks until 1991 when negotiations began again for the second time.  In 1991, attacks 
reached their peak at 145 attacks by the FARC.  This was at the start of negotiations 
between the FARC and the Colombian government.  Entering into the second year of 
negotiations in 1992, attacks dropped to 54 for that year.  Following the failed 
negotiations in 1992, attacks steadily climbed to a high of 152 attacks in 1997.  The 
following year in 1998, the Colombian government entered into negotiations with the 
FARC, where attacks plummeted to a low of 40 attacks.  Levels of violence remained 
steady throughout this concessional period until 2002 when the FARC and the Colombian 
government broke off negotiations, and attacks climbed to 108 attacks for that year.    
The increase and decrease of terrorist violence throughout these periods suggests 
that there may be a relationship between violence and concessional periods.  What is 
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 interesting to note is levels of violence were high at the start of the concessional period 
but quickly tapered off during the concessional period.  This tapering off, however, was 
followed by skyrocketing activity at the conclusion of each concessional period.  Figure 2 
reflects these levels of violence in relation to the four concessional periods with the 
Colombian government. 
 
Figure 2.  Levels of Violence 1975-2012 Overlaid by Concessional Periods  
(after START, 2014) 
2. Concessions 
The dependent variable for this study is concessions.  Granted, in some studies 
concessions are the independent variable, but for this study, it is the dependent variable.  
Concessions consist of an aggregate of six concessional criteria that are given different 
weights based on terrorist preferences.  The overall level of concession for each year is 
determined by the sum of all six concessional criterions.  The following sections discuss 
how each criterion was coded based on research and data drawn from GTD.  Figure 3 
reflects levels of concessions from 1975 to 2012.  The takeaway from this graph is that 
concessions fall into four clearly defined periods: 1982–1987, 1991–1992, 1998–2002, 
and 2012–present.  Each of these periods is distinct in that these are the only periods that 
the Colombian government entered into negotiations with the FARC.  The remaining 
years had concessions, but none of these years is as clearly defined by negotiations 
between the FARC and Colombian government. 
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Figure 3.  Government Concessions 1975–2012 
a. Removing Troops from Contested Land 
There is only one four-year period that the Colombian government removed all 
troops from a region within Colombia: 1998–2002.  Each year from 1998 to 2002, the 
Colombian government, under Pastrana’s rule, withdrew all troops from five different 
areas within Colombia and set up a demilitarized zone to begin discussions with the 
FARC (Chalk & Rabasa, 2001).  This period was coded a 2 for the years 1998, 1999, 
2001, and 2002.  In the year 2000, the FARC attacked and executed a delegate of the 
Colombian peace commission, Diego Turbay, which caused the Colombian government 
to recall the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and threaten to push troops back into the DMZ (p. 
74).  Later, under this threat, talks resumed in 2001–2002; both of these years received a 
coding of 2.  What is important during this period is that the Colombian government 
withdrew all troops; thus, this period is coded the highest weight of 2. 
b. Releasing Political Prisoners 
There are four instances in which the Colombian government released political 
prisoners as a concession to the FARC.  Each instance was coded a 1 because it met all 
the criteria for being considered a concession. 
The first instance came in 1982 under the administration of Colombian President 
Belisario Betancur.  Betancur authorized the release of 60 rebels and granted amnesty to 
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 dozens of other terrorists (BBC News, 2014).  This concession to terrorists was coded as 
a 1 because it met all of the criteria. 
The second instance came in 2001 when the Colombian government released 14 
FARC rebels in exchange for 359 Colombian police and military members (“The Sentinel 
Project for Genocide Prevention”, 2013).  The exchange was seen as a way forward in the 
peace talks between the FARC and the Pastrana administration.  Because this met all of 
the criteria for a concession, this year was coded a 1. 
The third instance came in 2004 under Colombian President Alvaro Uribe’s 
administration.  Seen as a hardliner against the terrorists, Uribe had no intention of 
making concessions.  Up until this point, his administration had always maintained an 
aggressive posture of attacking and neutralizing terrorist groups within Colombia, 
especially the FARC.  Under intense public pressure to find a resolution to the hostage 
dilemma, Uribe’s administration released 23 FARC prisoners with the hopes that the 
FARC would release some of the 1,600 hostages that it held.  The initial request was 59 
FARC rebels in exchange for 50 hostages, but this was rejected by the FARC (BBC 
News, 2004).  Although final totals have not been released, the government did make 
concessions in the hopes of securing hostages as part of the deal.  The resultant coding 
for this year was a 1 because it met all of the criteria. 
The fourth and final documented release of prisoners came in 2007 when the 
hardline administration of President Uribe authorized the release of hundreds of FARC 
rebels in the hopes of securing the release of political prisoners being held by the FARC, 
most notably Ingrid Betancourt, a former presidential candidate for Colombia (Moloney, 
2007).  The FARC rejected the exchange, but the result of the Colombian government’s 
willingness to make a concession to the terrorists codes this concession as a 1. 
c. Paying Ransom 
According to the GTD dataset, there are only three documented cases of ransoms 
paid to FARC terrorists (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism, 2013).  In 1976, Gustavo Curtis, a Beatrice Food manager, was kidnapped 
by the FARC.  In 1977, German industrialist Dieter Montuar was kidnapped by the 
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 FARC, and, in 1982, Julio Gomez Alzate, a Colombian cattleman was also kidnapped by 
the FARC (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 
2013).4  Because there is not enough information to dispute or refute ransoms being paid 
by governments or private contract firms, each instance was coded a 1 because it met the 
basic criteria established in Chapter 2.   
d. Granting Reforms (Land, Social, Political) 
There are two distinct periods in which land reforms have been granted to the 
FARC.  Each of these instances was coded a 1.  The first period, 1998-2002, land the size 
of Switzerland was set aside by the Colombian government and designated as a DMZ in 
which all Colombian troops were removed (“PBS News, 2011).  This DMZ was 
designated as Zona de Despeje and was set aside as a place for the FARC and the 
Colombian government to meet to discuss negotiations (Chalk & Rabasa, 2001, p. 73).  It 
was also seen as a concession by the government to the FARC.  This zone remained 
intact from 1998 to 2002.  There was one period in 2000 in which the zone was no longer 
considered a DMZ because of an attack by the FARC that resulted in the execution of a 
Colombian peace delegate.  This resulted in the year 2000 being coded as a 0 because the 
Colombian government had canceled the DMZ.  Shortly after, however, both the FARC 
and the Colombian government renewed discussions in 2001, at which point the DMZ 
was redesignated and extended through 2002.  Both of these years are coded a 1 because 
the DMZ remained intact. 
The second period of land reform came in 2012 under President Manuel Santos.  
The government has so far conceded to the terrorist’s demands of agrarian reform, which 
results in this year being coded a 1 (Brodzinsky, 2010).  The negotiations are ongoing 
and there is speculation that more reforms are on the way as the government attempts to 
balance inequality between the peasant farmers and the rural populace. 
4 Most governments do not acknowledge ransoms paid for hostages to avoid losing credibility.  For 
additional information, also see 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197609280001. 
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 e. Agreeing to Open Negotiations 
There are 14 instances in which the government made concessions with the 
terrorists by agreeing to negotiate terms to ending the conflict.  The instances can be 
grouped into five periods.   
The first period of negotiations occurs from 1982 to 1987. The Colombian 
government under the direction of Betancur sought to curb the violence that was racking 
the civilian community in Colombia.  During this period, negotiations were ongoing with 
no breaks or interruptions.  This period was marked by Betancur’s substantial Uribe 
Accords policy toward terrorists (Posso, 2004).  These were coded as a 1 for each year of 
the negotiations. 
The second period is from 1990 to 1991 and is under the administration of 
President Cesar Gaviria.  The Colombian government opened negotiations with the 
FARC in an effort to curb violent extremism.  The Simon Bolivar Guerilla Coordination 
Body, as previously mentioned, was created by the terrorists, including the FARC, to 
develop a common agenda among the guerrilla groups based on their needs (p. 48).  
Negotiations were ongoing until 1992, when a FARC emissary was killed by government 
forces; this resulted in all negotiations being called off.  Each of these years was coded as 
a 1 because it met all of the criteria established in Chapter 2.   
The third period is from 1998 to 2002.  As discussed previously, the Colombian 
government sought to negotiate an end to the conflict.  Each of these years is a coded a 1 
except for 2000 because of the assassination of a high-level Colombian diplomat.  The 
assassination led to the Colombian government and the FARC breaking off negotiations 
for that year.   
The fourth period is 2007, in which Uribe’s hardline administration began 
negotiations to attain the release of political prisoners, most notably Ingrid Betancourt.  
The Uribe administration also released many FARC prisoners as a sign of good will in 
the hopes that the FARC would follow suit.  This never occurred; however, that the 
government did enter negotiations, codes this year as a 1. 
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 The fifth and final period is 2012 and is ongoing as the FARC and the Colombian 
government negotiates over ceasefire conditions.  That both sides are negotiating codes 
this year as a 1, for it meets all of the previous established criteria. 
f. Granting of Political Autonomy 
There are two periods in which political autonomy was granted; 1984 and 2012.  
In 1984, the Uribe Accords were signed by Betancur as a way to address the FARC’s 
many grievances (p. 46).  One of the ways that Betancur sought to bring the FARC into 
the political sphere as part of the Accords was the establishment of Union Patriotica (UP) 
(p. 47).  The UP was the political wing of the FARC and had the authority to participate 
in politics within the Colombian government.  In 1991, the UP movement had died off, 
largely from assassinations and lack of support from the Colombian government.  
Notwithstanding, this year was coded as a 1 because of the UP’s creation. 
The second period is 2012, which is when the FARC and the Colombian 
government entered into negotiations.  The Colombian government has agreed to allow 
the FARC to have a political party within the Colombian government (BBC News, 2014).  
This results in a coding of 1 for this year. 
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 V. FINDINGS 
A. STATISTICAL FINDINGS 
This study did not yield any statistically significant results, but further qualitative 
analysis did provide some interesting findings. 
1. No Correlation 
Hypothesis 1 proposed in Chapter 1 that there is no correlation between levels of 
violence and governments making concessions.  This hypothesis was proven true.  With a 
confidence level set at α (.05) and a sample size of 37 (years), the results suggest that 
there is not a statistically significant (p =.894) correlation (r = .022) between levels of 
violence and governments making concessions.   
2. No Negative or Positive Linear Correlation  
Hypotheses 2 and 3 proposed that there is either a positive or negative linear 
correlation between levels of violence and governments making concessions.  These 
hypotheses were proven not to be true.  With a confidence level set at α (.05) and a 
sample size of 37 (years), the results suggests that there is not a statistically significant (p 
=.894) correlation (r = .022) between levels of violence and governments making 
concessions.    
3. Tipping Points 
Hypothesis 4 proposed that there is a tipping point relationship where levels of 
violence increase to a point that governments will make concessions.  Using logistic 
regression, the data was looked at by year and by conducting a running average to the 
point a concession was made.  With a confidence level set at α (.05) and a sample size of 
37 (years), the results suggests that there is not a statistically significant (p =.83) 
correlation (r = -.03) between levels of violence and governments making concessions.  
The results suggested a negative relationship, which suggests that as levels of violence 
increase concessions decrease. 
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 4. Further Analysis 
The data did not suggest any statistically significant correlation between levels of 
violence and governments making concessions.  Further analysis suggests there are two 
different groups of years: years with concessions and years without concessions.  If one 
were to average these years out with concessions, one would find that Tattacks averaged 
over time are greater in years with concessions than without concessions.  Based on 
further analysis of the data three additional hypotheses are proposed:   
• Hypothesis 5:  There is a positive relationship between levels of violence 
and time.     
• Hypothesis 6:  There is a positive relationship between average yearly 
levels of violence and government concessions.   
• Hypothesis 7:  There is a significant relationship between government 
concessions and political parties.     
These hypotheses were chosen based on the qualitative analysis of the literature 
and the data presented.   
• Hypothesis 5: Relationship between levels of Violence and Time 
The independent variable in this hypothesis is time and the dependent variable 
was levels of violence.  The hypothesis posits that there is a relationship between levels 
of violence and time.  The time variable consisted of all 37 years measured against the 
levels of violence for each year.  This test was run to see if time explains the change in 
levels of violence.   
With a confidence level set at α (.05) and a sample size of 37 (years), the results 
were statistically significant (p =.05) correlation (r = .09) between levels of violence and 
time.  This is a weak correlation (r = .09) explaining only a small percentage of the 
change in the levels of violence over time.  This suggests that there are other factors that 
might explain the change in levels of violence in Colombia. 
• Hypothesis 6: Positive Relationship between Average Yearly Levels of 
Violence and Concessions 
The independent variable in this hypothesis is levels of violence (averaged yearly) 
and the dependent variable was concessions.  This hypothesis posits that as total terrorist 
attacks (averaged yearly) increase, concessions will also increase.  This test is different 
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 from hypothesis1, which focused only on attacks for each year independently.  Average 
yearly attacks were calculated by adding the previous year(s) attacks plus current year 
attacks and generating a running average.  This average was then measured against 
concessions. 
With a confidence level set at α (.05) and a sample size of 37 (years), the results 
suggest that there is not a statistically significant (p =.24) correlation (r = .03) between 
levels of violence (running average) and government making concessions.   This is 
important in that it suggests that, regardless of the amount of violence perpetuated by the 
FARC, it did not influence the government to make concessions.  This further suggests 
that levels of violence will continue to increase over time.  This idea challenges the 
assumption that the situation in Colombia is better now than it has been in 50 years, since 
this idea posits that violence will continue to increase over the long term.  This 
dichotomy is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  Average Yearly Level of Violence 
• Hypothesis 7: Significant Relationship between Government Concessions 
and Political Parties 
The independent variable in this hypothesis is political parties and the dependent 
variable was government concessions.  This hypothesis posited that there is a significant 
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 suggests that different presidential parties affect if concessions will be made by the 
government.   
To code for this relationship, each president and their associated political party 
was added to the concessional coding table found in Appendix A.  The sample size 
consisted of 10 Colombian presidents covering a 37-year span.  There were four political 
parties represented by the 10 presidents and they were coded as follows: Conservative- 1, 
Liberal- 2, Colombia First-3, and National Unity Party-4.  Each of the presidents was 
then input into the table and coded according to the coding scheme.  Once coded, 
statistical tests were then performed on the data. 
With a confidence level set at α (.05) and a sample size of 37 (years), the results 
suggests that there is not a statistically significant (p =.08) correlation (r = .08) between 
government concessions and political party.  However, given that p = .08 and is only .02 
from being within tolerance, this suggests that given a larger sample size, the data may 
indicate a correlation.  Running the same test with a confidence level of α (.10), this 
would be statistically significant, suggesting that party affiliation does play a role in 
whether governments do or do not make concessions.  This is a weak correlation (r = .08) 
however and suggests that other factors may explain the change in concessions.  
B. PERIODIC FINDINGS 
My findings indicate there are four periods when the government made 
concessions with the FARC: 1) 1982–1987, 2) 1991–1992, 3) 1998–2002, and, 4) 2012 to 
present.  Each of these years is marked with different strategies and levels of concessions.  
Each period is marked by a different president in power with different strategies for 
dealing with the FARC.  They coincide with either the beginning of a new presidential 
term or the ending of a presidential term, suggesting a correlation between concessions 
and term limits.     
1. 1982–1987 
The Betancur administration (1982–1985) sought a more restrained approach to 
dealing with the FARC.  It was not passive but is characterized by the Uribe Accords and 
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 the creation of a FARC political party (Posso, 2004, p. 47).  One of Betancur’s 
presidential policies was to address the peace policies that had been established by 
President Turbay in the previous administration (Justice for Colombia, 2012).  Of most 
importance to Betancur was the commission that Turbay had established to address 
grievances with regards to an amnesty decree for rebels.  Betancur felt that this decree 
was lacking the political will needed to achieve a long-lasting change.  This is in large 
part what won him his election.   
With this strategy in mind, he created a 40-man peace commission that he felt 
could do what the commission created by Turbay could not, which was to truly address 
the Colombian populations grievances, and also correct the injustices from the amnesty 
decree (p. 47).  It was this 40 man peace commission that led to some of the concessions 
occurring during this period.  So in large part, the reason that concessions in this period 
are tied to presidential parties and policies is that Betancur was attempting to out-politick 
Turbay with his own peace commissions and strategies.  This created a political 
environment ripe for concessions. Towards the end of Betancur’s term however, most of 
the policies and peace commissions had become null, suggesting that there was a strong 
drive to address the FARC at start of the election cycle, but less so at the end of the 
presidential term. 
2. 1991–1992 
The political environment during this period is characterized by the creation of 
more peace commissions to counter the growing threat of insurgency.  Following the lead 
of President Barco’s administration (1986–1989), President Gaviria (1990–1993) sought 
a more conciliatory approach to the growing terrorist threat (Justice for Colombia, 2012).   
He created an “Advisory Committee to Public Order” in early 1991 followed by an 
advisory committee to “reintegration” a few months later to address the FARC and other 
terrorists operating in Colombia (Justice for Colombia, 2012).  It was through these 
commissions that Gaviria’s administration engaged in negotiations with the FARC.  
Similar to Betancur’s administration, concessions during this period can be tied to the 
presidential strategies of trying to find the right commission to deal with the FARC. 
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 The conciliatory approach of the Gaviria administration is characterized by 
successful negotiations with smaller groups, such as The National Liberation Army, in 
laying down their arms and joining the political process (Chalk & Rabasa, 2001, p. 72).  
Using this as a model, the Gaviria administration hoped that the FARC would also lay 
down its arms to no avail.  Broken negotiations led this administration to seeking a more 
aggressive approach against the FARC at the end of the administration.  Similar to 
Betancur’s administration, this suggests that concessions are linked to presidential terms. 
3. 1998–2002 
The Pastrana administration (1998–2002) had the most conciliatory approach of 
all the presidents and granted the most concessions to the terrorists.  One of Pastrana’s 
campaign promises was to initiate and make peace with the guerillas (Encyclopedia 
Britannica, 2014).  Following up with his campaign promise, he initiated secret talks with 
the FARC to setup the peace negotiations of 1998–2002.  It is through his campaign 
promises and commitment to follow through that lead to the concessions of this period.  
Towards the end of this period however, similar to the previous presidents, his strategies 
tapered off and his presidential term is most remembered for failed negotiations. 
4. 2012 to Present 
The political context of this period was established by President Alvaro Uribe’s 
(2002–2009) aggressive approach to dealing with the Colombian conflict.  Uribe’s stated 
goal was full defeat of the FARC and any other guerrillas in the country (Melo, 2013, p. 2). 
Uribe had garnered praise and support from the population of Colombia and was seen by 
many as the best president that Colombia had ever had.  President Santos (2010–present), 
following Uribe’s example, promised to crack down on the insurgent groups and adopt a 
policy of security similar to Uribe’s (Brodzinsky, 2010).  It was these campaign promises 
that by and large secured his election to presidency with a 69% majority vote (Brodzinsky, 
2010).  As part of his campaign promises however, he also promised to address the 
insurgent problem with policies that would unite the country in “harmony” towards a goal 
of peace (Brodzinsky, 2010).  It is through these campaign promises that some of the 
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 concessions during this period have stemmed as President Santos continues to work on 
disarming terrorist groups and establishing levels of security for all citizens in Colombia.   
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The data presented in this case suggests that there may be correlations between 
government concessions and two more variables that were not statistically analyzed in 
this study: 1) election cycles and 2) campaign promises.  
The first consideration for future research would be to look at the relationship 
between election cycles and government concessions.  This future study would analyze 
why concessions would occur at the beginning or the end of a presidential cycle.  There 
may be many reasons for this suggested relationship, maybe external pressure from 
international partners, such as the United States; only further analysis can yield insight to 
this variable.   
The second and final consideration for future research is the relationship between 
presidential campaign promises and government concessions.  Analyzing this variable 
would be different than looking at election cycles, the focus on this study would be to test 
if campaign promises lead to concessions.  Presidential candidates campaign and make 
promises to spur the vote for them at the polling booth.  This suggests that candidates 
may make promises on major issues, such as addressing the FARC problem in Colombia 
or crippling the drug trade.  Candidates recognize that tackling such tough issues can 
garner more votes and will feel compelled to address these issues once elected president.  
This may explain why some presidents during their campaigns felt a strong need to 
follow through with their promises, such as making concessions with terrorists in order to 
tackle the terrorist problem.   
D. CONCLUSION 
Although this study did not yield any statistically significant results for a 
relationship between levels of violence in Colombia and why the government made 
concessions, it did yield some insights as to the major conflict occurring in Colombia.  
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 The study also suggested that there is a correlation between presidential parties and 
governments making concessions.  More study should be done in this area.  
Furthermore, this study also proved that regardless of the level of violence a 
country faces, most countries will not make concessions based on this variable alone.  
There may be other variables at play here, such as presidential campaign promises and 
election cycles that may explain the change in violence throughout the course of 
Colombia’s long and violent history.  This only goes to show that when governments are 
faced with a terrorist dilemma, they have many options to choose from, but one option 
that all governments generally do not choose is to make concessions with terrorists, 
regardless of the level of violence. 
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 APPENDIX. CONCESSIONAL CODING TABLE 
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